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Abstract: Legal institutions are critical for the development of market-based economies.  
This paper defines legal institutions and discusses different indicators to measure their quality 
and efficiency.  It surveys a large historical and empirical literature showing the importance 
of legal institutions in explaining cross-country variation in economic development.  Finally, 
it presents and discusses three different views of why we can observe the large cross-country 
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1. Introduction  
Stark cross-country differences in levels of economic development have motivated 
economists to look for factors that explain these differences.  But there is also a historic 
dimension; it is only for the past 500 years that Europe has gained a dominant socio-
economic position, which has gone hand in hand with the rise of capitalism.  What has driven 
this increasing divergence in the economic fates of societies? This chapter focuses on the 
efficiency of legal institutions as a major explanation for the rise of capitalism in Europe and 
other parts of the world, including some – but far from all - areas settled and colonized by 
Europeans.  Specifically, this chapter (i) defines and discusses indicators of legal institutions, 
(ii) surveys the historic, theoretical and empirical literature on the importance of legal 
institutions for market-based capitalism and economic development and (iii) presents and 
compares different theories of why and how legal institutions developed differently across 
societies.  
  Until thirty years ago, economists focused mostly on production factors as major 
drivers of cross-country differences in GDP per capita.  Specifically, technological progress, 
capital accumulation and population growth have been considered critical factors of growth 
in the neoclassical growth theory (Solow, 1956).  The endogenous growth theory has focused 
on endogenous human capital accumulation as additional production factor and technological 
progress and constant returns to scale production functions as additional growth drivers 
(Romer, 1990, Aghion and Howitt, 1998).  However, early on, economists noted the large 
extent to which cross-country differences in levels of economic development could not be 
explained by production factors.  Solow (1957) pointed to the residual of more than 80% of 
cross-country variation in GDP growth, unexplained by differences in production factors, and 
attributed it to productivity growth.  Economists have therefore looked beyond the production   3 
function and focused on the organization of economies.  Adam Smith (1776) already stressed 
the importance of private property right protection for specialization and market exchange 
and thus ultimately for innovation and growth.  Hayek (1960, p. 140) pointed to private 
property right as “vital for preventing coercion, securing liberty and enhancing personal 
welfare.”  Economic historians, such as North and Thomas (1973), have provided first 
accounts of the critical role of institutions.  The Barro-style growth regression model has 
been used extensively by economists to study the relationship between institutions and 
growth. 
  However, it is not only economists that have explored the divergence in economic 
development and the rise of capitalism in Europe.  Historians, sociologists and 
anthropologists have studied the importance of institutions for economic development over 
the past centuries.  Going back even further, Jared Diamond (1997) reviews the past 10,000 
years of human history and attributes the success of Europe to the East-West geographic 
extension of Eurasia as opposed to the North-South orientation of Africa and the Americas.  
The East-West extension along similar climatic conditions allowed an easier spread of plants, 
domesticated animals and technology and thus enabled the faster development of Europe and 
Asia from hunters to settlers to states, implying an earlier build-up of the necessary 
institutions, ultimately explaining why it was Europeans who colonized the Americas and 
Africa and not the other way around.  
  This chapter focuses on the economic approach to institutions, thus focusing on their 
role of supporting markets and exchange between economic agents, overcoming market 
frictions.  This is somewhat different from the sociological and legal approaches to 
institutions and their role in society.  The sociological view of institutions focuses on 
interactions between individual within society and on dimensions such as normative   4 
behavior, social codes of conduct and beliefs, social structures and relationships and tradition 
(Greif, 2006, chapter 1; Smelser and Swedberg, 1994).  In the legal profession, there are 
different schools of thought, ranging from traditionalists who see law as supra-human, to 
realists who see law as manipulated by humans and interpreting it in the context of public 
choice theory (McNollgast, 2007).  Increasingly, however, economists have been influenced 
by the work in related disciplines.  Social codes and traditions are seen as important 
determinant of institutions and comparative law study has informed the legal origin view of 
legal institutions.  
  Legal institutions comprise a wide array of rules, arrangements and actual institutions.  
They support commercial transactions among agents that do not know each other, might not 
meet again and can therefore not rely on reputation and repeated interaction.  We can 
categorize legal institutions along several dimensions, whether they are private or public, 
information or enforcement based and whether they govern relationships between private 
agents or between private agents and governments.  Recent cross-country data collection 
efforts have allowed researchers quantifying certain legal processes and measuring the 
efficiency of legal systems.  Legal system indicators range from very general measures of the 
institutional framework over indicators of specific institutional arrangements and political 
structures to measures of specific legal procedures such as contract enforcement or property 
registration.  These different measures can also be mapped into different concepts of 
institutions, ranging from specific rules to a broader concept of the institutional framework as 
encompassing both informal and formal institutions of a society.  
Historic accounts, theory and empirical work have shown that legal institutions have a 
first-order impact on the structure and development of economies and have supported the rise 
of capitalism in Europe since Medieval times.  Critically, a growing literature has shown the   5 
importance of property rights for economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 
2005b).  This is confirmed by a large literature showing the importance of legal institutions 
explaining cross-country and cross-industry variation in entrepreneurship, formality, 
corporate governance and structure, firm investment and firm growth.  The experience of the 
transition economies over the past two decades has underlined the importance that effective 
legal institutions play for the successful transformation into a market economy (Beck and 
Laeven, 2006).  Similarly, a large empirical literature has shown the critical role that legal 
institutions play in the development and structure of financial systems, corporate structure 
and governance and firms’ investment decisions and growth (Beck and Levine, 2005). 
If legal institutions are so critical to economic development, why do not all countries 
adopt sound legal institutions? Different hypotheses have been put forward to explain the 
large cross-country divergence in legal system quality.  While the social conflict hypothesis 
conjectures that the socio-economic distribution of resources and political power determines 
formal institutions, including the legal framework, the legal origin view sees today’s legal 
institutions as result of legal tradition, which in most countries was inherited through 
colonization or imitation.  Policy choices made in France, the UK and Germany several 
centuries ago therefore have critical repercussions for legal institutions around the world 
today.  A third hypothesis points to different attitudes of major religions and different 
approaches of societies towards individualism and risk-taking as driving institutional 
differences across countries.  
It is important to point out the limitations of this survey.  First, while we will review 
the institution and growth literature to the extent that it is relevant for the role and origin of 
legal institutions in modern economies, this is not a complete survey of that literature 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005b).  This is also not a complete survey of the   6 
influence of historical development on today’s economic outcomes (Nunn, 2009).  Second, 
reform issues will not be discussed in depth, only to the extent that they illustrate the 
importance of specific legal institutions.
1
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 defines legal 
institutions and presents different attempts at measuring them.  Section 3 surveys the historic, 
theoretical and empirical literature that shows the importance of legal institutions for 
capitalism and economic development.  Section 4 presents different theories of the 
divergence of legal institutions across countries and empirical evidence.  Section 5 
summarizes and looks forward. 
  This survey is also related to several other recent 
surveys, including on the role of finance in economic growth (Levine, 2005a) and the 
importance of corporate governance for economic development (Morck, Wolfenzon and 
Yeung, 2005). 
 
2. What are legal institutions and how do we measure them? 
Discussing the importance of legal institutions requires first defining them.  
Furthermore, using legal institutions in empirical work requires having appropriate measures 
for them.  This section first defines legal institutions before discussing different indicators 
and measures for them. 
 
2.1. Defining legal institutions 
According to North (1990, p.3) institutions are the “rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction… they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic.”
2  Legal 
institutions – as subset of the overall institutional framework – can be defined as rules that   7 
govern commercial relationships between different agents of the society, i.e. firms, 
households, and government.  In the broadest sense, legal institutions thus support market-
based transactions by defining property rights and allowing for their transfer and protection.  
They allow for the writing and enforcing of contracts between agents that do not know each 
other, in a cost-effective manner, thus helping to avoid hold-up problems.  Legal institutions 
also provide public goods and govern externalities and third-party effects through providing 
coordination mechanisms and resolving collective action problems (Rubin, 2005). 
When defining legal institutions, one can distinguish between several levels, which 
are also reflected in the measurement of institutions, as I will discuss below.  On the most 
general level, “legal institutions” refer to the institutional framework that underpins 
contractual relationships in a society and encompasses not only laws and their enforcement, 
but also norms and values.  On a more specific level, we can refer to specific institutions that 
can be found across the world, such as court systems or property registries.  On an even more 
specific level, “legal institutions” refer to specific legal procedures, such as enforcing 
contracts or registering property, which can be undertaken in a different manner and by 
different institutional structures across countries.  
One specific set of institutions governs the relationship between agents within 
corporations.  Corporate governance is an important area of legal institutions (Morck, 
Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005) that defines the relationship between investors and managers 
and among investors with different stakes in the corporations.  This relationship can be 
defined by public rules and laws, but also rules within the corporation as well as norms and 
traditions developed over time.  One important dimension is the distribution of cash-flow 
rights on a corporation’s profits, the control rights over management and how the two relate 
to each other.  Over time, societies have defined these relationships in different ways and   8 
allowed for different corporate forms, such as partnerships, limited liability companies and 
publicly traded companies that allow separation of management and ownership.  As we will 
discuss below, corporate governance institutions also help define the boundary between intra- 
and inter-firm transactions.  
Given the intertemporal character of financial transactions and the high degree of 
asymmetric information and the resulting agency problems, legal institutions play an 
especially important role in the financial sector.  Among the institutions that financial 
economists have focused on are those governing agency relationships, such as the rights of 
secured and unsecured creditors vis-a-vis borrowers in- and outside bankruptcy and the rights 
of minority shareholders vis-a-vis management and blockholders, as well as institutions that 
help overcome information asymmetries, including the quality of accounting and auditing 
frameworks and systems of credit information sharing.  
One can classify the large number of legal institutions along different dimensions.  
Specifically, one can distinguish between (i) organic and designed institutions, (ii) 
information-based and enforcement-based institutions, and (iii) private and public 
institutions.
3  Critically, one can distinguish between contract enforcement and coercion-
constraining institutions.  
Let’s discuss first the difference between information-based and enforcement-based 
institutions (Dixit, 2009).  On the one extreme would be the internal value system, which 
might be influenced by social preferences and education, and bilateral interactions that 
govern the behavior of agents and commercial transactions.  Information intermediaries, such 
as social networks, trade organizations, credit bureaus or credit rating agencies are 
multilateral institutions that focus on information exchange, either in a decentralized or more 
centralized manner, and that provide a disciplining tool by helping agents build (or destroy)   9 
reputation capital.  Enforcement institutions, on the other hand, focus on direct, monetary or 
non-monetary, punishment as consequence of violating rules and can be regulatory agencies, 
courts and ancillary judicial services, thus mostly public institutions.
4  
  Another important distinction, which we will use throughout this chapter is that 
between institutions governing commercial relationships between two private parties and 
institutions governing relationships between private parties and the government.  These are 
also referred to as contract enforcement institutions and coercion-constraining institutions 
(Greif, 2005), respectively.  Coercion-constraining institutions prevent governments from 
expropriating private citizens and defaulting on their commitments.  Contract enforcement 
institutions, on the other hand, help resolve disputes between private parties.  While these two 
sets of institutions are certainly not independent from each other, there is not a perfect 
correlation, as we will discuss below.  
Among contract enforcement institutions, one can distinguish between private- and 
public-order legal institutions as well as between organic and designed institutions (Greif, 
2005).  While organic institutions arise endogenously out of the repeated exchange of agents, 
designed institutions are the result of coordinated actions of many individuals or government.  
The former can also be characterized as informal, while the latter as formal institutions.  
While the development of human societies from bands and tribes to chiefdoms and states has 
resulted in the development of public legal institutions supporting commercial transactions 
between agents that do not know each other, multilateral private institutions have also 
developed, both complementary and as substitute to public legal institutions. 
Beyond bilateral organic private-order institutions, which are based on reputation and 
relationships, multilateral reputation institutions can support market transactions in a wider 
range of circumstances and in somewhat broader markets, including across geographic   10 
distances and borders.  Multilateral arrangements rely on punishment by an individual 
member against another member who cheated a third party, also member of the network, 
without being directly negatively affected by the cheater (Greif, 2005).  The organic character 
of these institutions implies that in many cases common social, ethnic or cultural norms 
provide the conditions for such networks to arise and enable punishment.  Greif (1993) 
provides a detailed discussion of the Jewish Maghribi traders who traded all over Muslim 
dominated Mediterranean in the 11
th century and who used each other as agent for the sale of 
their goods.  Based on Law Merchant, a multilateral punishment system, and the expectation 
that only members of the network could be hired as agents the Maghibri trader network 
survived for many decades.  
While organic multilateral private institutions can help overcome the problem of 
asymmetric information, they also have shortcomings.  First, they are not inclusive as they 
are limited to members of certain groups with common backgrounds or common interests and 
thus exclude others.  Today’s ethnic networks in Africa are a good example; while helping 
their members, they exclude the majority of agents in the economy and therefore undermine 
demand for public institutions.  Second, organic multilateral private institutions are built for a 
specific, static environment, but cannot easily adapt to new and changing socio-economic 
circumstances.  They “are more likely to arise where markets are thin and participants locked 
into relationships” (Greif, 2005, p. 732).  Dixit (2003) shows theoretically how growth in the 
market beyond a certain threshold can lead to the breakdown of such networks.  Finally, the 
initial fixed costs of setting up organic multilateral private institutions are low, while the 
marginal costs are high; on the other hand, fixed costs are very high for the set-up of formal 
legal institutions, while marginal costs are low.  This makes the relative benefit of organic   11 
private multilateral arrangements decrease as the size of the population widens and the 
market increases in size and participants.  
Unlike organic private institutions, designed private institutions are “intentionally 
established by economic agents in response to profit opportunities” (Greif, 2005, p. 739).  
They are similar to organic private institutions as they rely on socio-economic sanctions by 
their members, while they share with public institutions the formal rules and the intentional 
design and therefore also adaptability.  They include business associations and self-regulated 
stock exchanges, but also private information providers, such as credit rating agencies and 
hotel franchises.  The Internet revolution has given rise to new multilateral private institutions 
enabling market exchange, such as eBay, an online auction and shopping website, and 
Craigslist, a centralized network of online classified advertisements.  The optimal size of 
such a private institutions depends positively on the speed with which information can be 
exchanged; in large networks with slow information sharing, violators might be able to 
continue in the network before word of their violation spreads.  Internet platforms such as 
eBay and Craigslist can therefore sustain a large number of participants, as information 
exchange is almost instantaneous.  
Another important private multilateral legal institution is arbitration, often an 
alternative to the public legal system that solves conflicts between contract parties that have 
pre-committed to using the arbitration system.  The advantages for the users are greater 
specialization and thus competence of the arbitrators, the use of customary law and flexibility 
in terms of which legal system to choose.  Arbitration without the backup by a public court 
system, however, is often not feasible, unless reputation forces the losing party to comply 
with the ruling (Rubin, 2005).   12 
Compared to private institutions, public order institutions use the power of a third 
party, the state, to enforce rules and laws.  They are open as they concern all agents in a 
political entity or beyond it in case of international legal institutions.  As in the case of private 
contract enforcement institutions, however, incentives for this third party, the courts, police 
etc., are important.  Judges and enforcement officials can be bribed and they can abuse their 
power.  Limiting the extent to which this happens is the function of coercion-constraining 
institutions.  
  Coercion-constraining institutions govern the relationships between private citizens 
and the government and are therefore an important basis for public contract enforcement 
institutions as well as a backdrop for private legal institutions.  Effective coercion-
constraining institutions protect private citizen against unjustified expropriation from the 
government.  They provide incentives for rulers and enforcement institutions to protect rather 
than abuse private property rights.  There are coercion-constraining institutions based on an 
administrative structure, or on the absence of the state in the commercial area, such as in 
China during most of the Empire (Greif, 2005).    The form of coercion-constraining 
institutions can determine the efficiency of public legal institutions.  Coercion-constraining 
institutions built on the absence of the state are not conducive to the building of efficient 
public contract enforcement institutions (Greif, 2005). 
Legal institutions are typically very persistent.  Public legal institutions are especially 
difficult to change as this involves large fixed costs.  Legal institutions are also self-
enforcing, if they reflect the socio-economic power distribution in a society and help to 
preserve it (see section 4).  In addition, initial private institutions influence the development 
of public institutions through the value system developed with these initial private institutions   13 
(Greif, 2005).  The persistence of legal institutions is also reflected in the classification of 
legal systems into Common and Civil Law systems (see section 4).  
 
2.2. Measuring legal institutions
5 
  While the legal and early institutional literature has extensively discussed different 
legal institutions and their importance, up until recently few quantitative measures of legal 
institutions and their quality were available.  Early indicators were survey-based responses by 
experts to questions such as: “How strong and impartial is the legal system?”or: “what is the 
risk of expropriation of private foreign investment by government“, compiled by the Political 
Risk Services (PRS) or Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI).
6  Such indicators are 
typically constructed on a scale of 1 to 6 or 1 to 10, with higher numbers indicating higher 
levels of institutional development.  
There are several concerns with expert survey-based measures of legal institutions.  
First, they are perception-based and might reflect outcomes, especially levels of economic 
development, rather than institutional inputs, which would undermine their use in 
establishing the relationship between institutions and GDP per capita (Glaeser et al., 2004).  
Second, these measures are very broad, encompassing both formal and informal institutions, 
and do not allow any statement about institution-specific characteristics.  They therefore also 
allow limited space for linking empirical findings to specific policy recommendations.  Third, 
the scaling can be rather arbitrary; is the difference between a four and a five in Rule of Law 
the same as the difference between a five and a six? Finally, these measures are based on 
responses by experts often focusing on conditions for foreign investors, thus affecting only a 
small part of the economy (Pande and Udry, 2006).  Institutional development, as perceived   14 
by these experts, might therefore not be relevant for economic decisions by large parts of the 
population in developing countries.  
An alternative approach tries to gauge the quality of coercion-constraining political 
institutions.  The Polity IV measure of constraints on the executive is one of the most 
frequently used indicators of coercion-constraining institutions.
7  While more specific than 
the PRS or BERI indicators, they are still based on expert opinion and do not refer to specific 
rules or institutional arrangements.  
More detailed measures of political structure and the relative power of different 
players focus on specific rules.  La Porta et al. (2004), for example, measure the tenure of 
Supreme Court justices and the possibilities of Supreme Courts to judge cases involving 
government administrations to construct indicators of judicial independence.  Beck et al. 
(2001) construct indicators of checks and balances based on the number of potential veto 
players in the political decision process, and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) show that political 
independence of central banks in the conduct of monetary policy is more likely in countries 
with higher checks and balances.  Similarly, voting procedures and average district sizes in 
parliamentary elections can have an important first-order effect on economic development 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003).   
A third type of institutional data refers to very specific contract enforcement 
institutions and their functioning.  Since 2000, the Doing Business initiative at the World 
Bank Group has collected data on very specific legal procedures.
8  These indicators measure 
the time it takes to register a new company or property claims and the registration costs.  
They gauge the time and costs of enforcing a standard contract and the recovery rate for 
creditors in a bankruptcy.  Cross-country comparability is ensured by defining standard 
situations, such as recovering the amount of a bounced check or evicting a non-paying tenant   15 
and standard asset size – e.g. relative to GDP per capita – for registration of property.  
Another and related set of indicators refers to specific laws on the books protecting the rights 
of secured creditors in and outside bankruptcy and the rights of minority shareholders vis-à-
vis majority shareholders and management.
9  These indicators have also been used to rank 
countries according to the ease of doing business and have provided impetus for reform 
efforts.  
Indicators of the political structure and specific dimensions of the business 
environment have the advantage that they measure very specific institutional arrangements on 
a consistent basis, which facilitates cross-country comparisons.  However, they also have 
several shortcomings.  First, they measure only public, but not private institutions.  This is 
important as Fafchamps (2004) points to the lack of private rather than public legal 
institutions as characterizing institutional development (or rather the lack thereof) in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Second, they might reflect de jure but not de-facto institutions, as illustrated 
very well by McMillan and Zoido (2004) for Peru under the Fujimoro regime in the 1990s, 
when the country received a perfect score for judicial independence while corruption was ripe 
in the judicial system. 
  A fourth category of proxies of the quality of legal institutions is based on firm- or 
household-level data.  Firm-level surveys since the late 1990s have included questions on the 
perceived quality of the judiciary, the extent to which the legal system constitutes a constraint 
to operation and growth of the enterprise, and the risk of expropriation by government.
10  
Such micro-data can capture not only cross-country variation in legal institutions, but also 
within-country variation in how legal institutions affect firms.  Schiffer and Weder (2001) 
and Beck et al. (2006a) show that these obstacles vary across firms of different sizes, 
ownership and corporate form.  There are several shortcomings to the use of such microdata,   16 
however.  First, they are subjective and might not necessarily represent binding constraints on 
firms.  Second, similar to aggregate survey data, they might be driven by outcomes, such as 
firm growth rather than being the driving force behind firm performance.  Nevertheless, using 
appropriate econometric models, firm-level assessments of legal institutions have been 
widely used to assess the relationship between legal institutions and firm performance (see 
the next section).  
  Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) and Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2006, 2009) have developed six meta-indicators of institutional development, based on a 
large array of different institutional indicators, among them an indicator of the Rule of Law, 
based on more than 40 underlying indicators from over 20 sources.  These indicators are 
estimates from an unobserved components model that assumes that the observed data on 
institutions are a linear function of the unobserved “true” measure of institutions.
11  Country 
estimates of institutions therefore come with standard errors, which helps underline an 
important point often ignored when using such indicators to compare and rank countries: 
small differences between countries or changes over time within countries might not be 
significant.  
Using different indicators of legal institutions also provides insights into the 
persistence of legal institutions.  While few indicators are available for more than ten years, 
some studies have collected data for one or few countries many years back.  Balas et al. 
(2009) show that judicial formalism was higher in Civil Code than in Common Code 
countries not only in 2000, but also in 1950.  On the other hand, Mussachio (2008) shows a 
reversal in shareholder and creditor rights in Brazil after a left-wing military take-over in 
1945 and presents evidence that many French Civil Code countries had as strong creditor   17 
rights as Common Law countries in the early 20
th century, while the opposite holds 
nowadays.  
Does the variation in the efficiency and quality of legal institutions across countries 
matter? Are informal legal institutions substitutes for formal legal institutions?  Or are they 
rather the results of the economic development process?  The next section will discuss 
historical and empirical evidence that legal institutions – both formal and informal – matter 
for modern market economies and the economic development process.  
 
3. Why are legal institutions important for a modern market economy? 
Many commercial transactions are sequential, i.e. the quid and the quo are temporally 
separated.  This is especially true for financial transactions where the gap between quid and 
quo can be years.  This provides opportunities for one of the parties to renege on her 
contractual commitments and can lead to hold-up problems that increase in the specificity of 
assets and relationships.  When deciding to renege, a party will compare the benefit of doing 
so with the cost, which – in the absence of legal institutions or plain violence - would be the 
loss of future business with the other party.  
Informal, bilateral arrangements are only feasible if there is no information 
asymmetry, implying geographic proximity and no alternative trading partner.  Even today, 
the limited choice of available partners can lock people into partnerships as McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999) report for Vietnam.  During most of human history, i.e. except for the last 
5,000 years or so, humans lived without formal private or public legal institutions.  
Organizations in bands or tribes did not require formal legal institutions as transactions were 
repeated and among agents who knew each other.  Rather, humans could rely on the logic of 
repeated games and reputation.    18 
Bilateral arrangements break down if markets become thicker, i.e. if contract parties 
have alternative partners for future transactions, thereby reducing the cost of cheating.  In 
addition, information asymmetries increase as markets grow in size and geographic 
extension.  Therefore, as tribes developed into chiefdoms and states, the likelihood of 
repeated transactions decreased and the need for rules to govern transactions between 
strangers arose.  As shown by Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004), third party enforcement enables 
a society to move away from being “a collection of bilateral trading islands” to a market with 
public offers and one-shot transactions between anonymous trading partners.  
    
3.1. Historic evidence 
Adam Smith already stressed that private property rights encourage economic agents 
to develop their property, generate wealth, and efficiently allocate resources based on the 
operation of markets (1776).  The importance of property rights and legal system efficiency 
in the rise of capitalism in the West has been documented by several economic historians.  
Among the first, North and Thomas (1973) pointed to the critical role of property right 
protection for international trade and economic development in Europe and North America.  
Similarly, Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) point to institutions favorable to commerce and the 
emergence of the corporation as critical explanations for the rise of Europe and the West.  
Engermann and Sokoloff (1997) describe how extractive coercion-constraining institutions 
helped secure the entrenchment of the ruling elite in large parts of Latin America and 
undermined the build-up of effective market-supporting legal institutions and public 
infrastructure, while broad-based coercion-constraining institutions in the Northern part of 
the Americas and the resulting private property right protection helped develop markets and 
ultimately fostered economic development.    19 
Avner Greif has described the positive effect of multilateral private and public 
contract enforcement institutions in the Medieval Ages on international trade and economic 
development.  Merchant guilds, such as based in several Italian Cities and the Hansa in 
Northern Europe, were important institutions to support international trade expansion in the 
11
th to 14
th century, also known as the Commercial Revolution, by overcoming rulers’ 
commitment problem to not expropriate through the threat of a complete boycott if one 
trader’s rights got abused (Greif, 1992).  Similarly, the Community Responsibility System, 
whereby a community was held responsible for the debts of a single member, was critical not 
only to the surge of European trade during that time, but also to the rise of financial markets, 
including the use of letters of credit, today a standard instrument of international trade credit 
(Greif, 2004).  But as already discussed above, organic private multilateral legal institutions 
such as the Maghribi Trader network also helped expand international trade.   
Greif (2006) also argues that the historic absence of public legal institutions in the 
commercial area explains why China did not manage to develop a functioning market 
economy.  While this gap was filled by private legal institutions, a tradition of coercion-
constraining institutions supporting public contract enforcement institutions could not 
develop, so that the eventual introduction of coercion-constraining institutions in the early 
20
th century did not protect private property rights from government abuse and expropriation.  
 
3.2. Legal institutions and the real economy 
A growing empirical literature has documented the important relationship between 
efficiency and structure of legal institutions and the process of economic development.  By 
documenting this relationship, this literature has also explored the different channels through 
which legal institutions help economic development.    20 
First, in environments where property rights are well defined and protected, people 
focus their entrepreneurial energy on innovative entrepreneurship rather than on predation 
and other criminal activity (Baumol, 1990).  At the same time, people have to spend less time 
and resources to protect themselves from predation – be it from other private agents or the 
government – and can therefore become more productive.  One convincing piece of micro-
level evidence to support this hypothesis comes from Field (2007) who exploits the staggered 
issue of land titles to over 1.2 million Peruvian households between 1996 and 2003 and finds 
a significant and large effect of formal property rights on labor supply.  Entry barriers into the 
formal economy can also have negative repercussions for entrepreneurship by preventing the 
entry of new firms and thus ultimately undermine innovation and competition.  Klapper, 
Laeven and Rajan (2006) show that high registration costs impede the entry and growth of 
new firms, especially in industries that rely more on new firm entry.  Along the same lines, 
Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2010) document how entry restrictions distort industrial 
competition, while Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007) show that countries with lower entry 
regulations see more entry in industries that are subject to expanding global demand and 
technology shifts.  Berkowitz and Jackson (2006) compare the experience in Poland and 
Russia and find that lower entry barriers in Poland not only led to a higher share of small 
enterprises after the start of transition than in Russia but also a significantly smaller increase 
in income inequality.  Using variation in the implementation of a business registration reform 
across Mexican municipalities, Bruhn (2008) finds a significant increase in registered 
enterprises as result of lower registration requirements and the introduction of a one-stop 
registration process.  
Exit barriers can also prevent the reallocation of assets to their most productive use in 
society.  The insolvency regime defines how a society deals with failing corporations -   21 
whether to restructure or liquidate them – and the rights of different stakeholders in this 
process.  The goal of the insolvency process should be a speedy, efficient and impartial 
resolution that maximizes the value of a firm’s assets by liquidating unviable enterprises and 
restructuring the liabilities of viable ones.  In reality, however, there is a wide variation in 
duration, efficiency and recovery rate of insolvency procedures around the world (Djankov et 
al., 2008a).  Gine and Love (2010) show that a reform leading to a streamlined bankruptcy 
and reorganization procedure in Colombia contributed to a more efficient selection of viable 
firms into reorganization and non-viable firms into liquidation, thus improving the economy-
wide allocation of assets.  But it is not only the laws on the books that matter; Claessens and 
Klapper (2005) find a higher use of insolvency procedures in countries with more efficient 
judicial systems.  The empirical evidence, however, does not always point to strong creditor 
rights in insolvency as the optimal policy; Acharya and Subramanian (2009) show that 
countries with more creditor-friendly insolvency regimes see fewer patents in industries that 
rely more on patents.  Industries relying more on innovation grow more slowly in countries 
with stronger creditor rights.  
Second, and related to the first point, the certainty of property rights facilitates 
investment and ultimately firm growth, as it increases investors’ confidence that they will be 
able to appropriate the returns of their investment.  Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) 
show that in transition countries with strong private property rights protection entrepreneurs 
are more likely to reinvest their profits.  Similarly, Cull and Xu (2005) find for China that 
both property right protection and access to credit matter for investment decisions of firms.  
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) find that both financial and legal constraints 
can hold back firm growth, with this effect being stronger for smaller firms and in countries 
with less developed financial and legal institutions.  Through their impact on investment,   22 
legal institutions also impact resource allocation, by influencing the industry structure of 
countries.  Industries that rely more on intangible assets, such as patents or trademarks, 
whose returns are harder to appropriate and which are easier to expropriate by competitors, 
grow faster in countries with better property right protection (Claessens and Laeven, 2003).  
Similarly, more efficient legal institutions increase the availability of financing to industries 
that need them most and foster the creation of new establishments in these industries (Beck 
and Levine, 2002).  
Third, entrepreneurs have higher incentives to work in the formal as opposed to the 
informal economy, if their property rights are protected and contract enforcement allows 
them to broaden their market outreach.  By participating in the formal economy, enterprises 
can access broader markets and benefit from public investment, so that a higher share of 
firms in the formal economy has positive repercussions for economic growth (La Porta and 
Shleifer, 2008).  Several cross-country studies provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis.  
Djankov et al. (2002) show that countries with higher entry barriers in the form of higher 
registration costs have larger informal economies.  Johnson et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) and 
Friedman et al. (2000) document the importance of the contractual framework in explaining 
variation in informality across countries.  
Fourth, legal institutions can have a critical impact on corporate structure and 
governance and ultimately firm size.  Specifically, better legal institutions allow firms to 
grow faster by becoming more efficient and expanding their markets.  Laeven and Woodruff 
(2007) show that firms in Mexican states with weaker legal institutions are smaller than in 
states with strong legal systems.  The effect of legal system quality is stronger for 
proprietorships than for incorporated enterprises, which is consistent with theories predicting 
that proprietors are relatively more reluctant to invest in their companies than incorporated   23 
firms in weak legal environments given the absence of risk diversification possibilities of 
such an enterprise.  However, legal system efficiency is also important for the rise of the 
limited liability corporation.  One of the reasons for cross-country variation in the likelihood 
of incorporating is the fact that incorporated firms face lower obstacles to their growth in 
countries with better developed financial sectors and efficient legal systems, strong 
shareholder and creditor rights, low regulatory burdens and corporate taxes and efficient 
bankruptcy processes; it is thus more attractive to incorporate in countries with more 
effective legal systems (Demirguc-Kunt, Love and Maksimovic, 2006).   
The impact of legal institutions on corporate governance structures of shareholding 
companies is also reflected in the valuations of firms by outside investors.  Claessens et al. 
(2000, 2002), La Porta et al. (2002) and Caprio, Laeven and Levine (2007) find a positive 
relationship between the protection of minority shareholder rights and corporate valuation on 
the stock exchange.  Nenova (2003) shows that the control premium stemming from holding 
a control proportion of a company’s shares can be as high as 50% of firms’ market value and 
is higher in countries with less efficient legal systems, where expropriation by the majority 
shareholder is easier, while Dyck and Zingales (2004) use data on sales of controlling blocks 
to show the importance of legal institutions, but also alternative control mechanisms, such as 
media and tax enforcement, to lower the private benefits of controlling a corporation.  
Through its impact on governance structures, legal institutions have a critical impact 
on the boundary between intra-firm and inter-firm transactions.  In societies with better 
property protection and contract enforcement, there will be more market transactions as 
agents can rely on the enforcement of third-party market exchanges, but also larger 
hierarchies and thus larger freestanding enterprises possible (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2006b).  On the other hand, weak property right protection will lead to the rise   24 
of pyramidal structures (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), with negative repercussions for 
innovation and growth, for several reasons.  First, in societies where most of the transactions 
takes place within (groups) of enterprises, capital allocation is also limited to intra-group 
allocation, thus reducing aggregate allocative efficiency (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005).  
Second, a limitation to intra-group transactions goes often hand in hand with barriers to entry 
and thus competition.  Third, there will be less innovation, as the losses for other enterprises 
and products arising from innovation might not be external to the group as would be the case 
for most freestanding enterprises (Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005).  Finally, these 
negative effects are exacerbated by connected lending through banks, especially if they are 
part of the group.
12 
  Fifth, a very rich literature has shown the importance of legal system efficiency for 
financial sector development, both in general, and with respect to specific institutions (Beck 
and Levine, 2005).  The rights of secured creditors and of minority shareholders have been 
found to be positively associated with the size of credit and stock markets across countries;
13 
credit information sharing is important for financial sector depth;
14 the effect of legal 
institutions on financial development can be traced through to economic growth;
15 and more 
efficient contract enforcement institutions are associated with lower interest margins, thus a 
higher intermediation efficiency.
16  
  The impact of legal institutions on financial sector development has also been 
explored on the country-level.  Visaria (2009) exploits subnational variation in the 
introduction of new tribunals to resolve large claim contract disputes and finds not only lower 
delinquency rates but also lower ex-ante interest rates for borrowers of large amounts.  
Variation in legal procedures and thus trial duration across Indian states can explain variation 
in farmers’ access to credit market and growth of the manufacturing sector (Chemin, 2009b).    25 
Recent research has also been able to differentiate between different institutions.  In the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe bank lending is more sensitive to reforms 
of collateral regimes than bankruptcy reform.
17  In Pakistan better judicial training for judges 
has a significant productivity effect, with the results of a higher case load for courts and new 
firm entry in the real sector.
18  
Given the micro-economic evidence for the importance of legal institutions, it is not 
surprising that researchers have been able to link institutional quality to economic 
development.  Using historical data to extract the exogenous component of countries’ legal 
institutions, and thus mitigate the concerns of reverse causation and simultaneity bias 
discussed above, recent work has shown the importance of institutions for economic growth.  
Hall and Jones (1999), Knack and Keefer (1997) and Mauro (1995) were among the first 
establishing an empirical relationship between institutions and growth across countries using 
an instrumental variable approach and exogenous country characteristics such as ethnic 
fractionalization to extract the exogenous component of institutions.  However, the most 
convincing empirical analysis so far is by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) 
who combine historical evidence with new data.  They show that former colonies with 
geographic endowments conducive to the rise of coercion-constraining institutions that 
protect property rights have significantly higher levels of GDP per capita today than former 
colonies with geographic endowments conducive to the rise of extractive coercion-
constraining institutions.  In transition economies, the speed at which market-compatible 
institutions were built after the start of transition had a critical impact on growth during the 
first post-communist decade (Beck and Laeven, 2006). 
 
3.3. Legal institutions and the international economy   26 
Legal system efficiency also has critical repercussions for the level and structure of 
real and financial flows across countries.  Lucas (1990) was the first to point to the paradox 
that capital does not flow to capital-scarce countries where the highest returns should be but 
rather to capital-abundant countries with low returns.  Khan (2001) explains this with the 
lower private appropriation of investment returns in countries with less efficient legal 
institutions.  This is confirmed by empirical work.  Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych 
(2008) show that cross-country differences in institutional development are an important 
factor in explaining the Lucas paradoxon.  Similarly, Papaioannou (2009) finds a positive 
relationship between the level of institutional development and international capital flows.  
Cross-country variation in legal institutions has also an impact on international trade 
patterns, as both theoretical and empirical work has shown.  This impact comes on top of the 
overall positive impact that public contract enforcement institutions have on the level of 
international trade, though the effect is economically smaller than one would expect
19 which 
points to the importance of private contract enforcement institutions, as already discussed in 
the context of the historic evidence above.
20  Including differences in the quality of contract 
enforcement institutions across countries can theoretically reverse predictions about factor 
price convergence and gains from trade.
21  Countries with more efficient contract 
enforcement institutions can gain comparative advantage in industries that depend more on 
legal institutions.  Using import data at the 4-digit industry level for the U.S., Levchenko 
(2007) shows that countries with better developed institutions are more likely to export goods 
to the U.S. in industries that rely on a greater number of inputs.  Along similar lines, Nunn 
(2007) constructs an indicator of the extent to which each industry relies on inputs that are 
traded on an exchange, reference priced or neither, with the latter conjectured to be more 
relationship-specific and thus relying more on legal institutions.  He finds that countries with   27 
more effective contract enforcement institutions export more in industries that rely more on 
relationship-specific inputs.   
The empirical work cited in this section has addressed endogeneity concerns using 
different econometric techniques, including instrumental variables, such as historic country 
traits relating to colonial history.  However, what is the reason that historic country traits such 
as legal origin or colonial experience are related to the quality of legal institutions today?  On 
a more basic level, why do some countries have more effective legal institutions than others?  
In the next section, we address this question.  
   
4. Why do legal institutions vary across countries? 
  If legal institutions are critical for the development of economies and for the rise of 
capitalism, well-informed policymakers around the globe should focus on constructing such 
institutions.  In reality, however, we observe a large variation in the design and efficiency of 
legal institutions across countries.  We can distinguish between three broad hypotheses for 
such variation – the social conflict, legal origin, and culture views.  These theories refer to 
institutions in the broader sense, both formal and informal, both coercion constraining and 
contract enforcing, though they have different emphases.  
  A fourth hypothesis that has dominated economic thinking until recently is that of 
efficient institutions.  This hypothesis would imply that each society adopts the institutions 
that meets its needs best (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1985).  This builds on one of the most 
important principles in institutional economics and in the field of law and economics - the 
Coase theorem, which states that as long as property rights are tradable, their initial definition 
and distribution is irrelevant as parties can trade these rights and thus achieve a Pareto 
improvement (Coase, 1960).  However, such a trade requires a clear definition of rights and a   28 
mechanism to trade them.  In the face of high transaction costs or the lack of a mechanism to 
transfer property rights in a certain and final manner to the most efficient owner, the Coase 
theorem will break down.  As we will discuss below, the Coase theorem also breaks down on 
a higher level on the creation of coercion-constraining institutions, as one of the parties 
involved (the state) is also an interested party in the transfer.  The efficient institution 
hypothesis has therefore lost appeal as an explanation for cross-country difference in the 
efficiency of legal institutions.  Informed by history, comparative legal studies and sociology, 
economists have considered alternative explanations for the wide cross-country variation in 
the efficiency of legal institutions. 
 
4.1. Social conflict theory 
The social conflict view, most clearly and eloquently formulated by Aceomglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2005b), builds on the premise that the institutional framework is 
endogenous, imposed by the group with the largest political power.  De jure political 
institutions reflect de facto political institutions that in turn are driven by resource distribution 
in a society.  Political institutions are persistent, as the ruling group will fortify its de facto 
political power with the structure of de jure political power.  The institutional framework is 
therefore not necessarily the most efficient, but rather the reflection of the economic and 
political distribution of power, which makes it inflexible when new opportunities or 
technologies arise.  The ruling elite will create coercion-constraining institutions that 
entrench its powers and dominance, rather than institutions that maximize society’s aggregate 
welfare.  Critically, negotiated solutions to improve the institutional framework to increase 
aggregate welfare are not possible because winners cannot commit to compensate losers, as   29 
they will be able to write the rules afterwards.  This is why the Political Coase theorem does 
not hold for coercion-constraining institutions (Acemoglu, 2003).   
Changes in the political and therefore legal institutions are only possible under outside 
pressure or exogenous shocks, such as new technologies, diseases or globalization.  One 
historic example, discussed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005b) is the devastating 
effect of the Black Death epidemics in the 1340s in Europe.  The dramatic reduction in the 
labor-land ratio increased peasants’ bargaining power vis-a-vis landlords and started the 
decline of feudalism.  
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005a) apply the social conflict theory to explain 
the rapid development of Europe after 1500, a process that can be seen as the First Great 
Divergence.  There was also a divergence within Europe, with some countries or areas 
developing significantly faster than others.  Specifically, Britain and Netherlands saw more 
rapid economic development after 1600 than other countries in Europe.  The access to 
Atlantic trade opportunities after 1500 in interaction with initially better institutions explains 
the divergence.  Specifically, both Britain and Netherlands had institutions that allowed 
merchants to benefit from the new trade opportunities in the Atlantic and thus gain economic 
power.  In the case of Britain, the merchants used this newly found economic power to fight 
for greater political power during the Civil War (1642-49) and the Glorious Revolution 
(1688/89).  In the Netherlands, the new wealth was used in the fight for independence from 
the Hapsburg Empire.  In other countries with vast Atlantic trade opportunities (France, 
Portugal and Spain), on the other hand, trade was monopolized by the government, with the 
gains thus flowing to the crown and further strengthening their economic and political power. 
  The social conflict hypothesis also finds support in the colonization experience.  
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) show how economic development across the   30 
areas colonized by Europeans experienced a great reversal in the 18
th and 19
th century, with 
areas that were wealthier at the time and during the initial period of colonization losing their 
position vis-a-vis areas that were relatively poor during the initial period of colonization.  
They attribute this reversal to two main factors.  First, in areas with disease environments 
friendly for colonizers, settler colonies were established with the necessary institutional 
framework for commercial transactions.  In areas with hostile disease environments, on the 
other hand, extractive colonies were established with little if any institutions.  Second, the 
population density of the colonized areas was critical in determining the nature of 
colonization.  Where areas were densely populated, little new European immigration took 
place; rather the native population was used for forced labor.  The institutional development 
during the colonial period persisted even after independence as the new incumbents used the 
existing institutional arrangements for their own purposes.  Critically, the reversal and 
divergence in economic development among colonies started after the Industrial Revolution, 
as institutions became more important as new technologies required broad and long-term 
investment.  
  The evidence presented by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson is complemented by 
historic accounts.  Engerman and Sokoloff conjecture that climatic conditions across the 
Americas provided different conditions for different crops and therefore agricultural 
organization and production.
22  While the climatic conditions in the Northern parts of North 
America were conducive to crops such as wheat and corn that were best produced by small-
hold farmers, the conditions in the South of the U.S. and the Caribbean were conducive to 
crops that were best grown on large plantations, such as tobacco or cotton.  Similarly, large 
parts of Spanish America had higher levels of natural resources and an abundant population 
that could be used for forced labor.  These differences had repercussions for the choice of   31 
agricultural production and immigration policies.  While the U.S. and Canada (as well as 
Argentina and Chile) encouraged open immigration from across Europe, immigration was 
restricted in other areas and the focus was on importing slaves rather than attracting free 
labor.  This went hand in hand with colonial governments granting monopolies to the ruling 
elite.  These different policies had implications for the political structure and the coercion-
constraining institutions built across different parts of the Americas.  While the large middle 
class arising in the North of the U.S. and Canada led to institutions that protected individual 
property rights, the enormous inequality in socio-economic conditions in other parts of the 
Americas led to building of extractive institutions that protected and entrenched the interests 
of the elite.  This had implications not only for public investment, including in education, but 
also the process of economic development and inequality over the following 200 years.
23  
Easterly and Levine (2003) confirm this hypothesis for a large cross-section of countries, 
linking different crops that are conducive to different agricultural organizations to institution 
building. 
  A related strand of literature relates to the existence and/or dominance of natural 
resources in an economy as explaining the lack of institution building (Sachs and Warner, 
2001).  It is generally easier to materialize short-term profits from natural resources such as 
oil than from fixed assets such as manufacturing plants, equipment and machinery, because 
proceeds from natural resources depend less on the creation of a market, human capital, and 
R&D investments.  This in turn reduces incentives to invest in institutions (Besley and 
Persson, 2010).  Higher natural resource abundance can thus increase the share of 
entrepreneurs engaged in rent-seeking rather than productive activities, with negative 
repercussions for economic growth (Torvik, 2002).  The surplus nature of natural resources 
allows elites to extract rents and perpetuate their socio-political power.  Beck and Laeven   32 
(2006) show that variation in the extent of natural resources across transition economies can 
partly explain variation in institution building after 1990, when all these countries faced the 
same challenge of building market-compatible institutions.  Cross-country regressions have 
confirmed this negative relationship between natural resource abundance and the rule of 
law
24, control of corruption
25 and overall institutional capacity.
26  
  Related to the social conflict view is the hypothesis that ethnically fractionalized 
societies are more likely to develop extractive institutions as the ruling ethnic group tries to 
cement its dominance over the other group(s) (ab)using coercion-constraining institutions.  
Easterly and Levine (1997) show that the ethnic fractionalization can explain a large share of 
today’s underdevelopment in Africa, while Coffee (2001) posits that the ethnic and societal 
homogeneity in Scandinavia can explain the socio-economic success of these countries.  
  While institutions are persistent, they can also be endogenously unstable, as with the 
Community Responsibility System in the Medieval Ages already mentioned above (Greif, 
1992).  This contract enforcement system was supported by coercion-constraining institutions 
reflecting the interests of those benefitting most from international trade.  As the size of the 
network as well as the heterogeneity within the communities and across communities in 
terms of wealth and size increased, the benefits became less and less equally distributed 
within and across communities and the costs of verification of community affiliation 
increased.  Ultimately, the system became a victim of its own success.  
  Social conflict theory also makes predictions about the relationship between the 
corporate sector and the political elite.  In societies with more concentrated ownership in the 
corporate sector, entrepreneurs will be more likely to invest in political connections to 
preserve their privileged position and erect entry barriers against potential competitors, a 
phenomenon that Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005) refer to as economic entrenchment.
27    33 
Through political connections, the corporate elite is able to influence the development of 
legal institutions, ultimately leading to something that Hellman et al. (2000) referred to as 
“state capture” in the context of the transition economies.
28 
Critically, the social conflict view holds that coercion-constraining institutions have a 
first-order effect on economic development and attributes less importance to contract 
enforcement institutions.  Greif (2005, p. 728) posits that “the ability to effectively supply 
designed… contract-enforcement institutions, depends on the prevailing coercion 
constraining institutions…” This is confirmed by the historical accounts by Malmendier 
(2009) that the Roman form of the shareholding company developed in the early – legally 
less developed – days of the Roman Republic, when it was supported by the political 
environment, while it disappeared during the Roman Empire, when the coercion-constraining 
environment was not favorable towards such an institution, in spite of increasing legal 
sophistication.  Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that coercion-constraining institutions 
can explain cross-country variation in GDP per capita, while contract enforcement 
institutions cannot.  As discussed by Woodruff (2006), however, these results might reflect 
the accuracy with which these two kinds of institutions are measured, rather than the 
importance of these two types of institutions.  
   In summary, social conflict theory posits that the efficiency of legal institutions, 
especially of coercion-constraining institutions, is the result of the distribution of socio-
economic resources and power.  It also posits that institutions are persistent and can most 
easily be affected and changed by influences outside the “system”, including technological 
innovations, trade or war.  The work by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson has started a large 
and still growing literature that relates historical events to patterns of institutional and 
ultimately socio-economic development today.  Some of the work is on the cross-country or   34 
regional level, while other work exploits historic and institutional variation within large 
countries, such as India or the U.S.
29  
  While there is considerable historical and empirical evidence in support of social 
conflict theory, it has also been criticized.
30  Specifically, geographic endowments, such as 
the disease environment or distance from the equator might have a direct impact on economic 
development rather than through institution building.  This geography view posits that 
temperate climates, such as in Europe, North America and Australia have the advantage of 
higher crop yields, fewer fatal diseases and more conducive temperatures for economic 
activity.
31  Similarly, being landlocked can have negative repercussions for accessing other 
markets and thus exploit scale economies.  Several studies, however, show that the effect of 
geographic endowments goes through institution building rather than having a direct impact 
on economic development.
32  Perhaps most convincingly, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2002) show that the growth divergence between settler and extractive colonies started with 
the Industrial Revolution rather than before, underlining the importance of institutions for 
sectors that rely heavily on specialization and division of labor. 
 
4.2. Legal origin view 
A second view is that the legal tradition adopted by countries has a critical impact on 
the nature of legal institutions and ultimately economic and societal organization.
33  This 
view has been informed by the comparative law literature that categorizes legal systems into 
several families or traditions as, most importantly, Common and Civil Law Code systems.
34  
While Common Law can be described as decentralized or bottom-up law, code or statute law 
is centralized or top-down law.  Djankov et al. (2003b) argue that in constructing their legal 
institutions societies face the trade-off between addressing disorder stemming from market   35 
failure and avoiding government failure and abuse.  Any government strong enough to 
impose effective public contract enforcement institutions is strong enough to abuse them 
unless restrained by effective coercion-constraining institutions.  Different legal traditions 
have chosen different points along the line of this trade-off.  Specifically, European history 
has determined the relative trade-off for a few countries and enshrined them in legal tradition, 
with repercussions for the rest of the world that received these legal traditions through 
colonization or imitation. 
But let us step even further back to Roman history.  Different approaches to legal 
system development can already be observed during Roman history.  While Roman law had 
developed over centuries on a case-by-case basis, adjusting from the needs of a small farmer 
community to the needs of a world empire with only a minor role left for formal legislation, 
Emperor Justinian changed this process by codifying existing law into the Codex Justinian in 
529 AD.  This was part of an attempt to not only eliminate jurisprudence and gain control by 
the chief executive over the law- and rule-making process, but also a political attempt at 
power concentration.  This “Justinian deviation”, however, did not succeed; rather, 
jurisprudence continued to shape the law.  Over the next centuries, European law developed 
in a piecemeal manner, with several legal frameworks, such as canonical and merchant law 
competing with each other. 
The Medieval Ages saw a critical difference in political structure between England 
and France that shaped the development of their legal systems.
35  The French Crown wanted 
to use the judiciary to unify a politically divided and strife-ridden country and therefore 
adopted a centralized and inquisitor judicial system, while the English crown could afford a 
relatively decentralized judiciary as England was relatively more peaceful but also politically 
more unified during this period.  Therefore, England developed jury trials as early as the 12
th   36 
century and adopted the Magna Carta with Habeas Corpus rights in 1215.  The legal 
development in England in the following centuries was dominated by competition between 
several court systems, including ecclesiastical, royal, feudal and mercantile law courts 
(Zywicki, 2003).  As parties could choose their court, the outcome - the adoption of the Law 
Merchant into common law – can be considered the most efficient one.  
The 17
th and 18
th centuries deepened the differences between the legal traditions in 
England and the European Continent.  English Common law asserted its independence from 
the State during the great conflict between Parliament and the English kings in the 16
th and 
17
th centuries.  While the Crown attempted to reassert feudal prerogatives and sell monopoly 
rights to cope with budgetary shortfalls, Parliament (composed mostly of landowners and 
wealthy merchants) along with the courts took the side of the property owners against the 
Crown.  This political struggle culminated in 1688, when the Stuarts were thrown out and 
James I lost his head.  Being on the winning side, the English judiciary gained considerable 
independence from the Crown, including lifetime tenure in the 1701 Act of Settlement.  
Important consequences of this independence were the respect for private property in English 
law, especially against possible encroachments by the sovereign, and for freedom of 
contracting. 
On the other extreme, Napoleon made a similar attempt as Justinian at codifying law, 
exploiting the fact that the French judiciary had been on the losing side of the revolution.  
Like Justinian, Napoleon sought a code that was so clear, complete, and coherent that there 
would be no need for judges to deliberate publicly about which laws, customs, and past 
experiences apply to new, evolving situations.  As in the case of Justinian, the French 
deviation did not hold for long.  Nevertheless, critical differences between both legal 
traditions survived and were widened in their export to other countries.  Specifically,   37 
jurisprudence and precedence have a limited role in the French Civil Code system, while 
procedural rigidity is more important.  Similarly, the judicial approach of the Civil Code 
system is inquisitor as opposed to the adversary approach of the Common Law system that 
requires open arguments.  Finally, the role of the judge is quite different in the two legal 
traditions, with the judge being independent from government in the Common Law tradition, 
while being seen as an executor of law in the Civil Law tradition.  
The German and Scandinavian legal systems developed somewhat separately, but 
were informed by the Common and French Civil Code approach.  In the case of the German 
legal tradition, simultaneously developed in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, the 
development and adaptability of legal systems is a critical element in the respective codes.  In 
the German Civil Code, for example, several articles refer to “good faith” (Art. 157 and 242), 
and emphasize that the “underlying intention and not the literal meaning of the word should 
prevail” (Art. 133), which allows judges to adapt to new circumstances and go beyond formal 
rules.  
The British Common Law tradition was transplanted around the globe via 
colonization, while Napoleon spread his Code throughout Continental Europe and the French 
legal tradition was in turn spread by the French, Belgians, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese to 
their respective colonies.  The German Civil Code spread through imitation to Japan and 
from there to Korea and China.  Critically, not only the codes but the legal culture was 
transplanted, with important repercussion for legal system efficiency in the receiving 
countries.  As shown by La Porta el al. (1997, 1998) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2003a), the different development of the legal families had important implications for the 
legal institutions.  And while there are arguments that legal systems within the Industrialized   38 
World have started to converge recently, the differences across legal families have been 
exacerbated in their export outside Europe.   
There are several reasons why transplantation of the Napoleonic Code to colonies 
outside Europe had more detrimental consequences than within Europe.  First, the Europeans 
rigidly imposed the Code Civil in their colonies even though there were – and remain -- 
serious tensions between the Code and indigenous laws, which impeded the efficient 
development of legal institutions.
36  Second, while the European nations overcame the 
rigidities of the Napoleonic Code, they exported its antagonism toward jurisprudence and its 
reliance on judicial formalism to minimize the role of judges.  They also exported the French 
tradition of avoiding open disputes about legal interpretation and the Napoleonic doctrine to 
formally inhibit open disputations by judges on how to weigh competing statutes, ambiguous 
laws, and past court decisions in deciding new cases hindered the development of efficient 
legal systems around the world.  Third, given the Napoleonic doctrine, judges frequently “… 
are at the bottom of the scale of prestige among the legal professions in France and in many 
nations that adopted the French Revolutionary reforms, and the best people in those nations 
accordingly seek other legal careers” (Merryman, 1996, p. 116).  As a consequence, the 
legislature will have a tendency to write “bright line laws” to limit the role of the courts.  
Once a country adopts the “bright line” approach to law making, it is very difficult to change, 
as courts will not be challenged to develop legal procedures and methods to deal with new 
circumstances thus retarding the development of efficiently adaptive legal systems (Pistor et 
al. 2002, 2003).   
Legal traditions in Europe have repercussions for both coercion-constraining and 
contract enforcement institutions.  The political structure implied by the Civil Code tradition 
foresees a strong executive vis-a-vis a purely executing and not-independent judiciary, while   39 
the Common Law tradition foresees a strong and independent judiciary.  This is confirmed 
when comparing indicators of judicial independence across legal families (La Porta et al., 
2004).  Similarly, Berkowitz and Clay (2005, 2006, 2007) use the fact that parts of the U.S. 
were originally colonized by Civil Code countries, such as Mexico, France or Spain to show 
the persistence of legal tradition, as states with Civil Law tradition were less likely to grant 
independence to their judiciary in the 20
th century, provide them with fewer resources, and 
have lower-quality courts at the beginning of the 21
st century.  The flexibility and adaptability 
of contract enforcement institutions also vary across legal traditions.  While the French Civil 
Code systems rely more on formalistic procedures and on judgments based narrowly on 
statutory law, the Common Law tradition embraces case law and judicial discretion (Djankov 
et al., 2003a).  Further, litigation against existing rules and laws helps find the most efficient 
outcome (Posner, 1973).  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003b, 2005) demonstrate that it 
is this difference in adaptability of legal systems rather than judicial independence that can 
explain differences in financial sector development and financial constraints reported by 
firms.   
  The effect of legal origin is not limited to legal institutions, but has had a much 
broader impact on the societal organization of economies.
37  The approach of the Civil Law 
system is policy implementing and socially-conditioned private contracting, while Common 
Law can be considered dispute resolving and unconditioned private contracting.
38  This 
difference can even be traced back to different schools of philosophy.  While Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s social contract (1762) built on the idea of the state securing freedom, equality and 
justice for all, even if against the will of the majority, John Locke (1689) started from the 
individual and his right to defend his “life, health, liberty of possessions”.  These different 
approaches towards society and policy-making can be observed across a large set of policy   40 
areas.  Entry into the formal economy is subject to more cumbersome regulation in Civil than 
in Common Law countries;
39  labor market regulation is less employer friendly in Civil Code 
countries;
40  media freedom is lower in Civil Code countries;
41 military conscription is more 
likely in Civil Code countries;
42 and individual liberties and private property rights are more 
strongly protected in Common Law countries.
43  Mahoney (2001) finds a higher growth rate 
of Common Law countries over the period 1960 to 1992 than Civil Code countries. 
  Common law and Civil law also have different approaches to enterprises, with 
repercussions for corporate governance (Ahlering and Deakin, 2007).  While the Common 
law tradition sees an enterprise as a purely private initiative with workers being contractual 
claimants on its revenues, the Civil Code tradition of Continental Europe sees workers as 
stakeholders with rights beyond their contractual claims and employers with obligations 
beyond contractual relationships.  On an even broader level, Pistor (2005) links the legal 
origin of the OECD countries with two different models of market economies: liberal market 
economies where the control rights are on the individual level and transactions are 
undertaken in competitive markets and at arms-length and coordinated market economies 
where control rights are vested to a larger extent in groups and the government and non-
market exchanges have an important role.  She links the difference between liberal and 
coordinated market economies to the respective legal tradition: Common Law in the case of 
liberal and Civil Code in the case of coordinated market economies. 
  The legal tradition view has been criticized for several different reasons.  First, 
categorization into a few legal families is seen as too crude.  For instance, Franks and 
Sussman (2005) describe differences in the adaptability of two Common law countries: the 
United Kingdom and the United States, where in the UK freedom of contracting 
predominates the rights of judges, while the reverse holds in the U.S. Berkowitz, Pistor, and   41 
Richard (2002) stress that the transplant process – not just whether countries are classified as 
having British, French, German, or Scandinavian legal origins – is important for establishing 
well-functioning legal systems.  Pistor et al. (2002) describe the significant differences in the 
transplant process in Colombia and Chile, which resulted in the latter adopting more 
appropriate and efficient legal institutions than the former.  Second, several authors have 
focused on the time variation in legal institutions, which is not compatible with time-invariant 
legal traditions and have suggested that it is changing political conditions that determine 
institutions (e.g. Pagano and Volpin, 2005).  Brunt (2007) analyzes the transition of South 
Africa from a Dutch to an English colony and shows that it is the definition of property rights 
and thus coercion-constraining institutions rather than changes in contract enforcement 
institutions that resulted in improvements in agricultural productivity and output in the early 
19
th century.  
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003a) and Levine (2005) conduct a horse race 
between the social conflict and the legal origin view and show that among former colonies, 
both proxies for the social conflict view and legal origin dummies can explain cross-country 
variation in property right protection and financial development.  
 
4.3. Culture and religion 
A third strand of the literature focuses on cultural and religious differences across 
nations driving differences in legal institutions.  Weber (1958) attributes the success of Great 
Britain and other European countries to the Calvinistic Reformation and its emphasis on 
individual accountability, thus fostering entrepreneurship and competition.  The more 
hierarchical religions, such as Catholicism and Islam, on the other hand, are more hostile to 
free competition and market exchanges (La Porta et al., 1999).  In the 19
th century this   42 
became obvious, when the Catholic Church embraced corporatism as an alternative economic 
model to socialism and capitalism that featured an economy’s organization into vertical 
corporations and cartel like structures that prevented competition from new entrants as well 
as wage and price controls (Morck and Yeung, 2009).  This model was happily adopted by 
several South European dictators in the 20
th century, including Mussolini and Franco, as well 
as later by several Latin American countries.  This should be therefore also reflected in the 
legal institutions developed in countries dominated by different religions or denominations.  
La Porta et al. (1999) show that the quality of government is indeed higher in Protestant 
countries than in countries dominated by Catholics or Muslims.  The difference in legal 
institutions across major religions can also be observed in the legal institutions underpinning 
the financial sector (Stulz and Williamson, 2003).  In particular, the Catholic Church has 
historically taken a negative stance toward the charging of interest and creditor rights, while 
the Qur’an prohibits the charging of interest.  In contrast, the Protestant Reformation 
advanced a different religious attitude towards finance, whereby the payment of interest was 
considered a normal part of commerce, so that the rights of creditors were more naturally 
emphasized in countries dominated by Protestant religions.  As shown by Stulz and 
Williamson (2003), countries with a predominantly Catholic religious heritage tend to have 
less developed credit markets and more poorly developed financial institutions.   
Another critical difference across nations is the attitude towards individualism and 
risk-taking.  Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2005) show that the variation in the quality of 
legal institutions across countries can be partly explained by variation in societal attitudes 
towards assertiveness, venturing and active determination and individualism, as opposed to 
risk avoidance and collectivism.  Greif (1994) applies the distinction between 
communalist/collectivist and individualist societies to discuss the different development of   43 
China and Europe and explains why it was Europe that gave rise to capitalism, not China.  
The absence of the Chinese state in the commercial area and the rise of organic communalist 
contract-enforcement institutions, influenced by the Confucian ideology that focuses on 
informal rather than formal conflict resolution, ultimately resulted in an institutional 
development that did not provide for the necessary public contract-enforcement institutions 
as in Europe.
44  This is different from the individualistic tradition in Europe, going back to 
ancient Greece and early Christianity, which allowed the establishment of economically 
motivated, rather than kin-based private institutions.  Similarly, the ethnic fractionalization in 
many African countries gives rise to segregated organic communalist private legal systems 
that prevent the rise of designed private and public legal institutions.  The ultimate 
consequence is that it is the absence of designed private multilateral legal institutions and not 
necessarily the lack of public legal institutions that explains the low quality of legal 
institutions in many developing countries (Fafchamps, 2004).  More than in the other two 
views, the culture and religion view sees private institutions, both organic and designed, as 
critical as they impact the subsequent development of public institutions. 
Finally, specific historic events might turn into a traumatic experience for nations, 
with long-ranging implications for institutions.  Murphy (2005) sees the 1720s Mississippi 
Bubble with its subsequent banking crisis and hyperinflation as critical for the negative 
French attitude towards the financial sector.  Similarly, the hyperinflationary experience in 
Germany has resulted in a hawkish approach towards monetary policy deeply entrenched in 
Germany for the following 80 years.  Malmendier and Nagel (2010) show that “depression 
babies”, i.e. individuals growing up during the depression era in the U.S. are less likely to 
invest in equity and have overall more risk-averse investment strategies.   
   44 
4.4. From the origin of institutions to their impact on economic development 
The three explanations discussed above are competing but not exclusive; however, 
they have different implications for policy reforms, focusing either on coercion-constraining 
institutions, public contract enforcement institutions or on the underlying informal 
institutions.  All three hypotheses posit the persistence of institutions, though for different 
reasons.  However, increasing globalization together with the recent IT revolution has 
reduced communication costs to almost zero, and might have an additional impact (Morck 
and Yeung, 2009).  Specifically, suppressive coercion-constraining institutions might be 
easier to challenge in times of globalization and rapid information flows, as suggested by 
political revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the early years of the 21
st century.  
The systematic variation of legal institutions with historic country characteristics 
allows the use of these characteristics as instrumental variables in regressions of real sector 
outcomes on indicators of (legal) institutions.  They are exogenous to today’s real sector 
outcome, including economic development, and can explain cross-country variation in 
today’s (legal) institutions.  At first look, these variables therefore seem good instruments and 
their use will allow us to answer several questions, on the origin of institutions and on the 
channels through which institutions affect real sector outcomes.  Recently, however, doubts 
have been raised.  
First, as already discussed above, measurement issues have been raised.  Albouy 
(2004) has shed doubts on the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson data on settler mortality.  
Legal origin dummies have been seen as too rough and simplistic.  Measuring religion is 
complicated by the fact that the dominance of a religion or denomination might not 
necessarily be captured by the percentage of population being nominally registered, but the 
intensity of religious practice.  In addition, there might be a high correlation between French   45 
Legal Origin and the dominance of the Catholic denomination, as becomes obvious in the 
discussion of corporatism, originally championed by the Catholic Church, but propagated in 
countries both dominated by the Catholic denomination and political structures fostered by 
the Napoleonic legal tradition.  
Second, the exclusion condition, i.e. the condition that the exogenous characteristics 
influence the dependent variable only through the endogenous variable, is hard to test.  As 
shown by the prolific La Porta et al. group, legal origin can explain an array of institutional 
arrangements.  However, this also disqualifies legal origin as instrument for one specific 
institution, since using it as instrument for one institution might lead to an upwards 
coefficient estimate in the second stage if the instrument is correlated in the same direction 
with another omitted institution.  This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the number of 
exogenous country traits is limited. 
Relating exogenous country traits to the development of legal institutions has 
therefore helped us understand the origins of legal system development.  However, there is a 
limit to which using these country traits as instruments can help us understand the 
relationship between legal institutions and real sector outcomes and help us even less 
unbundling institutions.  Other methodologies might be more helpful, an issue I will pick up 
in the last concluding section of this chapter. 
 
5. Implications for policy reform and future research 
This chapter surveyed the literature on legal institutions and their importance for 
market-based capitalism and economic development.  This concluding section discusses what 
we have learned and where there are still gaps.  I also point to some policy conclusions from 
this research program.   46 
A large literature has shown the importance of legal institutions for the real economy.  
Coercion-constraining institutions that guarantee private property rights and effective 
contract enforcement institutions that resolve conflicts in a swift, predictable and fair manner 
foster entrepreneurship and investment in the formal economy, enhance market exchange and 
trade within and between countries and ultimately help economies grow faster.  Less is 
known, however, about which institutions matter.  While Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have 
undertaken a first attempt in disentangling the effect of coercion-constraining and public 
contract enforcement institutions, more work remains to be done.  More promising than 
cross-country work seem to be in this context country-level studies that allow the study of the 
functioning of specific institutions within a country, best to do when introduced in a 
staggered manner.
45  The shortcoming of such a country-specific approach is the lack of 
external validity beyond the country being studied.  One can hope that through accumulation 
of studies the profession will get to consistent results.  Further, most of the empirical 
literature has focused so far on public institutions, while private contract enforcement 
institutions and their interaction with public institution have been significantly less explored.  
A recent but growing literature has linked social capital to real sector outcomes
46; bridging 
the gap between that literature and the literature on public legal institutions will bring us 
closer in understanding the relative importance and complementarities of public and private 
institutions.  New private institutions arising on the Internet, such as eBay and Craigslist, are 
important to understand in this context.  On a more general level, the faster speed and lower 
costs of information transfer and dissemination might have important repercussions for the 
emergence and importance of private legal institutions, an area that certainly will be the focus 
of intensive research in the coming years.    47 
While a large literature has helped us understand the historic origins of legal 
institutions, including colonial ties, less is known about the cultural origins of legal 
institutions.  This debate has obtained new attention as China has recently been cited as 
“counter-example” for the law and development and – more specifically – the law and 
finance literature, as it has economically thrived without the public legal institutions of the 
West.
47  Understanding the interaction between private and public legal institutions over time 
and across countries is thus not only important for assessing their relative importance for 
economic development, but also for understanding the origins of legal institutions.   
As discussed above, a lot of progress has been made in constructing indicators of 
public legal institutions, while there is still a significant gap on measures of private 
institutions.  Promising in this context seem to be enterprise and household data.  While firm-
level surveys regularly include questions on the functioning of legal systems from firms’ 
viewpoint, these questions focus on public institutions only; expanding the questionnaire to 
private legal institutions is important to understand the use of both public and private contract 
enforcement.  Similarly, designing household surveys on the use of public institutions and 
private arrangements for conflict resolution can help make progress in this area.
48  
The research discussed in this survey has also critical repercussions for policy reform 
in developing countries.  The finding that legal institutions have a critical impact on the 
development and structure of economies calls for attaching a high priority to reforms in this 
area.  This certainly has been heeded by international organization and donors.  However, the 
experience in transition and developing countries as well as the literature also provides 
important insights into how to reform legal institutions.  First, legal institutions have to be 
seen in the context of the legal tradition of a country.  Trying to impose institutions out of a 
different legal tradition is not helpful, as Russia found out the hard way; the short flirt with   48 
the Common Law tradition did not bear fruits.  A different focus might therefore be called 
for.  Take the example of court reform.  In spite of their shortcomings and deficiencies, court 
systems in the former British colonies still have a reasonable reputation.  They can rely on a 
large body of case law and precedents, from London and other parts of the former British 
Empire.  What courts in many common-law countries in Africa are lacking are capacity and 
specific skills.  The introduction of commercial courts might be helpful in this context.  The 
situation in most Civil Code countries in Africa is different, as courts in these countries have 
deficiencies along many dimensions and suffer from very low reputation.  In these countries, 
establishing alternative dispute resolution systems might be more helpful.  Second, in the 
absence of external pressures, legal system reform cannot happen against the interests of the 
ruling elite.  Again, the experience of the transition economies has clearly shown this.  In 
countries with more entrenched communist elite and where these elites had higher surplus 
stakes in the form of natural resource rents, there was a slower or no development of the 
necessary legal institutions for a functioning market economy (Beck and Laeven, 2006).  A 
third important insight from the literature is that contract enforcement institutions cannot be 
separated from coercion-constraining institutions.  While the legal and economic literature 
has made a distinction between these two types of institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson, 
2005), there is a high correlation and interaction between both of them, even if this is not 
always documented in the data.  The state cannot really function as neutral arbiter in disputes 
between private agents, if it cannot be held accountable through coercion-constraining 
institutions (Greif, 2005).  
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Endnotes – Chapter 2 
 
1 As one example, see Black and Tarassova (2002) for the challenges of legal system 
reform in Russia.  
2 An alternative concept refers to “economic governance”, defined as “structure and 
functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic activity and economic 
transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to 
provide physical and organizational infrastructure” (Dixit, 2009). 
3 See Dixit (2009) and Greif (2005). 
4 Dixit (2009) refers to these different institutions as first-party (value), second-party 
(bi- and multilateral private institutions) and third party (public institutions).  
5 For a similar discussion on measuring institutions more generally, see Woodruff 
(2006).  
6 For a good description of indicators measuring different aspects of the institutional 
framework, see Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) and subsequent papers by 
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006, 2009). 
7 Specifically, this indicator “refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the 
decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities”, ranging 
from unlimited authority (one) to executive parity or subordination (seven).  See Marshall 
and Jaggers (2009). 
8 For details and data, see: www.doingbusiness.org.  
9 La Porta et al., (1997, 1998) and Djankov et al. (2008b). 
10 For details and data, see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.    50 
 
11 See Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) and Kaufman, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2006, 2009) for a detailed discussion. 
12 See Caprio, Laeven and Levine (2007), and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Zamarripa (2003). 
13 La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). 
14Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007).  
15 Levine (1998, 1999) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000). 
16 Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) and Laeven and Majnoni (2005). 
17 Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2010).  Not surprisingly, given their heavier reliance on 
secured lending, foreign bank lending increases by even more. 
18 Chemin (2009a). 
19 Leeson (2008). 
20 See Rauch (2001) for an overview.  
21 Costinot (2009), Acemoglu, Antras and Helpman (2007) and  Levchenko (2007). 
22 Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000). 
23 See Engerman, Mariscal and Sokoloff (2009) and Nunn (2008). 
24 Norman (2009). 
25 Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004). 
26 Isham et al., (2005). 
27 See Faccio (2006) and Braun and Raddatz (2009) for the financial sector. 
28 The role of the oligarchs in Russia is probably one of the most illustrative examples 
of how the new corporate elite entrenched their position through political connections, 
culminating the in the dominance of politics by oligarchs towards the end of the Yeltsin 
government and maybe even beyond that.    51 
 
29 See Nunn (2009) for an overview. 
30 Given the high profile nature of the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson work, it is 
not surprising that their work has been especially closely scrutinized. Albouy (2004) sheds 
doubt on their settler mortality measure, while Glaeser et al. (2004) claim that it is human 
capital accumulation rather than institutions that can explain cross-country variation in 
economic growth.  
31 Landes (1998), Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Diamond (1997). 
32 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi (2004). 
33 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) for a recent overview.  
34  Zweigert and Kötz (1998), Reynolds and Flores (1989), Glendon et al. (1982); and 
David and Brierley (1985). 
35 Dawson (1960), Berman (1983), and Glaeser and Shleifer (2002). 
36 Zweigert and Kötz (1998) and Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2002). 
37 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) for an overview. 
38 Damaska (1986) and Pistor (2005). 
39 Djankov et al. (2002). 
40 Botero et al. (2004). 
41 Djankov et al. (2003c). 
42 Mulligan and Shleifer (2005a,b). 
43 Scully (1992), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003a) and Levine (2005b). 
44 See also Hamilton (1990). 
45 See, e.g., Chemin (2009a, b), Visaria (2009), and Bruhn (2008). 
46 See Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) for a survey.   52 
 
47 See, e.g., Allen and Qian (2009). 
48 See, e.g., Gramatikov et al. (2010).   53 
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